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üks vana artikkel ka:
BAKU, Azerbaijan - China's worldwide quest for energy resources to fuel its rapidly growing economy has sharpened its interest in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
Last week, it was reported that a joint venture of the China National Petroleum Corporation, China's biggest oil company, and PetroChina, its publicly traded subsidiary, is seeking to buy PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian company that operates in Kazakhstan.
The bid puts China in direct competition with an Indian state-owned company: the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), India's primary state-owned oil company. According to the New York Times, the Chinese joint venture offered $3.2 billion, which was less than the offer of $3.6 billion made by ONGC along with Lakshmi Mittal, a London-based steel tycoon.
Analysts said that PetroChina and another potential bidder, Russian Lukoil, would be in the best positions to gain control of PetroKazakhstan because of their strong presence in Central Asia and their sound relations with the governments there, according to a report by Reuters.
An Aug. 15 report by Eurasianet.org quoted Tanya Malcolm, a regional analyst for the New York-based Eurasia Group, as suggesting that PetroChina would be best positioned to acquire PetroKazakhstan because, after already making several small acquisitions, Chinese officials have built a degree of trust among the Kazakh authorities and bureaucracy.
The Chinese bid for PetroKazakhstan follows a failed bid by China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. (CNOOC) for Unocal Corporation, a U.S. firm. CNOOC offered more for Unocal than did its rival Chevron, and Fu Chengyu, its chairman and CEO, argued that the bid was strictly commercial rather than political or strategic. Nevertheless, CNOOC withdrew its offer, citing intense political opposition to the deal in the U.S. Congress.
Despite Chengyu's statement that the offer was strictly commercial, many analysts saw it as part of an overall strategic effort by China to help secure energy supplies. China is the most populous country in the world. In 2004, its economy grew at a sizzling rate of 9.5 percent. During the first half of 2005, economic growth continued at that rate, though it is expected to cool off and end the year with growth of 9 percent.
China first became a net oil importer in 1993. In 2003, it surpassed Japan to become the second-largest consumer of petroleum products at 6.5 million barrels per day.
The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy projects that China's energy demand will reach 14.2 million barrels per day by 2025, of which the country will have to import 10.9 million barrels per day. During the past four years, China has accounted for 40 percent of the growth in world oil demand, making it a critical factor in world oil markets.
China's energy demand has risen rapidly because strategic, growing industries such as agriculture, construction and steel and cement manufacturing require large volumes of energy. Increasing air travel and car ownership also have increased China's energy demand, Chietijg Bajpaee wrote in an analysis for the Power and Interest News Report.
China has made efforts to address its energy demand domestically, increasing domestic exploration, diversifying to other energy sources, promoting energy conservation and establishing strategic energy reserves.
Nevertheless, with its need for energy imports growing so rapidly, China has engaged in a global quest to secure energy sources. In particular, China has attempted to diversify its energy sources in order to lessen its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. These efforts have extended to Russia, Africa, Latin America, Canada, the East and South China Seas and the Caspian.
In some cases, China's international energy policy has brought it into conflict with the United States.
For example, China has cooperated closely with Sudan's government while securing oil fields there, and it has resisted U.S. efforts to put international pressure on Sudan to end the genocide in Darfur. Last fall it also signed a large gas deal with Iran, and it has signaled its resistance to U.S. efforts to bring the issue of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons before the U.N. Security Council. China also fears that in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. Navy could choke off China's energy supply by blocking sea lanes.
China's efforts in Kazakhstan also come in the context of ongoing efforts to convince Russia to build a pipeline from Siberia to Daqing province in China's northeast.
In this contest, Russia has played China and Japan off each other. Japan seeks a pipeline from Siberia to the Russian Far East port city of Nakhodka, from which oil could be shipped to Japan and other locations in Asia. In January, Russia said that it would build the Nakhodka pipeline, but experts now say the pipeline may reach that far only if massive new crude oil resources are discovered in Siberia. China may end up receiving all of the pipeline's crude oil by unloading it from the first 1,000-km stretch along the Russian-Chinese border, according to Reuters.
The major project in Chinese-Kazakh energy cooperation now is the 988-kilometer-long Atasu-Xinjiang pipeline, which is scheduled to come online later this year. The pipeline will extend from Kazakhstan's central Karaganda region to China's northwestern Xinjiang region. China and Kazakhstan struck the deal to build the pipeline in May 2004 after seven years of negotiations. Chinese officials eventually hope to extend that pipeline in order to reach the Caspian Sea. In that case, the Atasu-Xinjiang pipeline would be part of a 3,000-kilometer project to reach the Caspian, according to a report last year by Radio Free Asia.
Chinese and Kazakh officials also have discussed ways to connect Kazakh natural gas with China's West-East pipeline, which runs from Western Xinjiang Province to Shanghai, according to a recent report by Eurasianet.org.
China's interest in the Caspian region began with Kazakhstan, with which it shares a border, and has extended to Azerbaijan. In Kazakhstan, China has largely focused on developing onshore reserves and has secured only a few contracts to develop offshore reserves, which promise the highest profits but require large-scale investment. China's projects in Azerbaijan are limited to onshore development.
Sinopec's exploration and development subsidiary Sheng Li bought three oil blocks in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea in December 2003 for exploration. Big Sky Kazakhstan, in which Broadband-China, a full subsidiary of Sheng Li, has a 50 percent stake, held the licenses for the three blocks, Morskoye, Karatal and Dauletaly.
However, also in 2003, the Chinese companies Sinopec and CNOOC attempted to acquire a 16.67 percent stake from British Gas in the North Caspian Sea PSA, including the giant Kashagan offshore field in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea, for $1.23 billion. The project's operator was Agip, which held a 16.67 percent stake in the consortium. ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch/Shell and Total each held 16.67 percent stakes, while ConocoPhillips and Inpex each held 8.33 percent stakes. These shareholders used their preemption rights to block the deal.
In Azerbaijan, Chinese companies are participating in four projects, each of which involves the rehabilitation and development of onshore fields.
The largest of these projects involves a consortium developing the Kursangi-Garabagli oil fields, which is being led by Salyan Oil Ltd. Originally, the production-sharing agreement (PSA) for rehabilitation, exploration and development was signed on April 22, 1999, by the U.S. Frontera Resources (30 percent) and U.S./Saudi Delta Hess (20 percent) with the Azeri state oil company SOCAR (50 percent). The Chinese company CDODC has since acquired a 25 percent stake, as Frontera Resources used its stake as collateral to borrow $60 million from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The contracted area holds estimated reserves of about 17 million tons of crude oil and requires an estimated $1 billion in investment to develop.
In 2003, Salyan Oil contracted with Chinese Great Wall Drilling to explore the Garabagli field and drill wells in the northern and central parts of the bloc that go 3,500-4,000 meters deep. The company expects daily production from each well to be as much as 40-45 tons of oil.
Another onshore project in which the Chinese have participated is at Southwest Golubstan. On Nov. 27, 1998, an exploration and development PSA was signed by the British company Commonwealth Oil and Gas (67.25 percent), Sooner International (12.75 percent) and SOCAR (20 percent). Eventually Chinese companies gained an 80 percent stake in the project. Recoverable reserves are estimated at 15 million tons of oil and 25 cubic meters of gas requiring $900 million in investment.
Another PSA was signed on June 4, 2003, to develop the Pirsagat onshore field. The Chinese company Shengli holds a 50 percent stake, SOCAR holds 20 percent and Middle East Petroleum, based in the United Arab Emirates, acquired 30 percent in December 2003.
The most recent PSA that includes Chinese participation was signed on June 18, 2004, to develop the Garachukhur fields. SOCAR holds a 25 percent stake, while Nobel Sky holds the remaining 75 percent. Noble Sky is a joint venture of Middle East Petroleum and the Chinese company Sheng Li Oilfield.
China's growing need for energy clearly is an important factor in its increasing interest in Central Asia and the Caspian region. However, experts say geopolitical factors are also an important consideration.
China is undergoing a rapid economic expansion and military modernization that could in the upcoming decades make it a great power capable of challenging the United States. Therefore, it is now seeking to build good relations with states along its borders and foster stability in them.
Niklas Swanstrom, executive director of the Program for Contemporary Silk Road Studies at Sweden's Uppsala University, said in a story published by Radio Free Asia that China's foreign policy in Central Asia is motivated not only by energy concerns, but by larger issues.
China seeks energy in Central Asia, Swanstrom said, but it also wants to secure its borders and enhance stability in Central Asia. A major reason, he said, is that any instability or military conflicts in Central Asia are likely to spill over into Xinjiang, China's westernmost province that is home to a minority Uighur population. China has cracked down on Uighur separatism, accusing some separatists of terrorism.
China's concerns about extremism, separatism and terrorism in Central Asia are shared by other regional powers. This has helped bring about nascent geopolitical shifts in recent months.
In July, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which consists of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, called for the United States to set a timetable for withdrawing its military bases from Central Asia. The United States established air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in order to support operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
This statement followed a March revolt in Kyrgyzstan that overthrew President Askar Akayev and a blood crackdown in the eastern Uzbek city of Andizhan in May that may have left as many as 700 people dead. The United States called for an international investigation of the Andizhan events, which Uzbekistan refused. Russia and China fully supported Uzbek President Islam Karimov, saying they shared his concern with the three evils of extremism, separatism and terrorism. This month, Uzbekistan requested that the United States withdraw from its base in that country within 180 days.
Last week, Russia and China began conducting joint military exercises near the Shandong peninsula. Military officials said the war games were designed to simulate a situation in which the government of a third country had collapsed because of terrorism. Some observers speculated that China also had in mind a possible conflict over Taiwan, while Russia may have seen the war games as a chance to sell China more weapons. These moves toward greater Russian-Chinese cooperation, grounded partly in shared interests concerning Central Asia, are worrisome to many U.S. and Western officials.
Regardless of how the region's geopolitics evolve, the competition for Central Asian energy resources continues. Chinese companies have suffered a number of setbacks worldwide in countries including Australia, Thailand and Russia. Officials of the China National Petroleum Corporation and PetroChina are hoping that their bid for PetroKazakhstan could kick off a winning streak.