Eilne päev oli makrouudiste ja tegelikult ka muude sündmuste osas vaene, ent sellele vaatamata kujunesid liikumised turgudel võrdlemisi drastiliseks võttes arvesse seda tasast sõitu, millega on viimastel kuudel harjutud. Stoxx 600 kaotas päeva lõpuks -2,7% oma väärtusest, mis oli suurim kukkumine alates eelmise aasta novembrist ning peamiselt finantside ja tööstusettevõtete vedamisel kaotas S&P 500 -1,5%…samuti suurim langus alates detsembrist.
S&P 500 indeks
Konkreetset katalüsaatorit on keeruline välja tuua, kui ühe peamise tegurina võis kasumivõtu põhjustada ebakindlus Kreeka PSI suhtes ning erisuguste lugude ringlemine meedias kuni selleni välja, et võib-olla tuleb soovitud mahu täissaamiseks tähtaega pikendada. Kreeka ise eitas viimast ning tuletas ähvardaval toonil meelde, et kes võla restruktureerimises ei osale, ei pruugi üldse midagi oma investeeringust tagasi saada.
Antud kuupäeva lähenedes jääb turu tähelepanu Kreekale, kuid selle kõrval võiks tänastest olulisematest makromajanduslikest uudistest välja tuua Saksamaa töötleva tööstuse jaanuari tellimuste (kl 13.00), USA veebruari ADP küsitluse (kl 15.15) ja USA tarbijate jaanuarikuu krediidi muutuse (kl 22.00).
USA indeksite futuurid on näitamas 0,3%list taastumist ja Euroopa on aga avanemas kerges miinuses.
Keeruline on öelda, kas eilsed sündmused on märgilise tähendusega turu tipu saavutamisest lähiajaks, ent teatud usku see karudesse kindlasti süstis. Rev Shark tõdeb, et üldiselt säärastes olukordades allatrend alguse saab, kuid võttes arvesse viimaste kuude vankumatut ülestrendi, siis tasub esialgu jälgida, kas õnnestub siit põrgata või mitte.
After a day like today you have to be mentally ready in the event downside momentum picks up. You can be sure the media will immediately start chattering about how we are due to bounce back at any moment, but the important thing is to be ready in case this is a top and a trend change is occurring. Days like today are how downtrends start. That doesn't mean we are going to go straight down, but we have to watch how bounces play out and see how support holds from here.
The good news is that this is the sort of action that helps create a new supply of opportunities. We need a little back-and-forth action to set up new trades. I always feel more optimistic after a day like this because it should create entries and setups in my favorite stocks.
After a day like today you have to be mentally ready in the event downside momentum picks up. You can be sure the media will immediately start chattering about how we are due to bounce back at any moment, but the important thing is to be ready in case this is a top and a trend change is occurring. Days like today are how downtrends start. That doesn't mean we are going to go straight down, but we have to watch how bounces play out and see how support holds from here.
The good news is that this is the sort of action that helps create a new supply of opportunities. We need a little back-and-forth action to set up new trades. I always feel more optimistic after a day like this because it should create entries and setups in my favorite stocks.
The Telegraphilt lihtne graafiline seletus Kreeka tragöödia arengu kohta. Lisaks seletus eesoleva võlakirja vahetusega kaasnevate kaotuste kohta riikide lõikes:
The bond swap offer is part of a €130 billion bailout package, which is expected to be taken up by around two thirds of Greek bond-holders and is likely to hit French, German and British banks.
Parties who accept the proposed restructuring deal are expected to lose 53.5 per cent of the nominal value of any Greek bonds, with the reduction in net present value of their investments reaching 70 per cent.
According to data released by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) for the third quarter of 2011, the private sector of European countries who report to the BIS would lose €25.8 billion if all investors took up the swap deal.
France is likely to be the hardest hit as its private sector holds more Greek bonds than any other nation. Claims by the French private sector amounted to over €30 billion in the third quarter of 2011 but returns could be slashed to €9 billion following the swap.
British and German investors also stand to make big losses as the second and third largest holders of Greek bonds. The value of private sector investments in the UK currently stands at €6.4 billion, meaning affected parties will lose a total of almost €4.5 billion.
Erko Rebane
Konkreetset katalüsaatorit on keeruline välja tuua, kui ühe peamise tegurina võis kasumivõtu põhjustada ebakindlus Kreeka PSI suhtes ning erisuguste lugude ringlemine meedias kuni selleni välja, et võib-olla tuleb soovitud mahu täissaamiseks tähtaega pikendada. Kreeka ise eitas viimast ning tuletas ähvardaval toonil meelde, et kes võla restruktureerimises ei osale, ei pruugi üldse midagi oma investeeringust tagasi saada.
Esmaspäevast alates ringlesid kuuldused tähtaja pikendamise vajadusestst, võibolla ECB pessimistlikust vaatest tulenevalt, aga nii Kreeka pressišeff kui ka Venizelos kinnitasid, et homme 21:00 on tähtaeg ja nii see jääbki. Venizelos lisas juurde, et investoritel pole soodne vagusi olla lootuses saada täisväljamakse, kuna Kreeka on koheselt valmis CAC rakendama. Venizelost tuleb mõista - nii kui PSI õnnestub ja teise abipaketi teine osamakse kinnitatud, taandub ta valitsusest ja hakkab PASOK liidri valimisteks valmistuma. Venizelos tõesti on jätmas endadt kui matsi muljet. Diplomaat ta pole, seda kohe kindlasti.
PSI asi saab kinnitust see nädal. Kas EU pankade nõue rekapitaliseerida juuniks 9% ulatuses on jätkuvalt jõus? Mis arengud selles vallas on? PSI toimumise tähtaega kuidagi mõjutab?
Winger, Risto valuutaturgude teemas "Kreekal on vaja, et vahetusprogrammis osaleks vähemalt 60% võlakirja omanikest, sest siis saaks valitsus kehtestada collective action clause'i CAC-i, et suruda skeem peale ka kõikide ülejäänud investoritele." Kui seega peaks juhtuma, et lõpuks < 60% võtab haircuti ei saa kreeklased CACi üldse käiku lasta ja peaksid lunastama 100%, milleks neil raha pole = default. Seda varianti kõik kardavadki.
Praeguste sündmuste juures default on pea olematu tõenäosusega. Ristol on õigus, lihtsalt praegu tehakse asi ära kergelt jõu positsioonilt. Tõde saabub hiljemalt homme 21:00. 20 märtsi raha on olemas.
The country's six biggest banks have decided to take part in a bond swap deal to ease the state's debt burden, the finance ministry said in a statement on Tuesday. About eight or nine of the country's pension funds holding Greek sovereign debt have also agreed to take part in the bond exchange but five have refused to do so. The pension funds have come under pressure from workers' unions worried the debt writedown will affect the viability of their funds.
Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble predicts a sufficient majority of banks will accept a reduction in the value of Greek government bonds, Bayerischer Rundfunk reported, citing an interview. According to Bloomberg, Schaeuble also said he was optimistic that the threshold for approval of the agreement by two thirds of all creditors will be met by the March 8 deadline, the TV station cited the finance minister as saying.
Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble predicts a sufficient majority of banks will accept a reduction in the value of Greek government bonds, Bayerischer Rundfunk reported, citing an interview. According to Bloomberg, Schaeuble also said he was optimistic that the threshold for approval of the agreement by two thirds of all creditors will be met by the March 8 deadline, the TV station cited the finance minister as saying.
Twelve banks, insurers, asset managers and hedge funds in the steering committee of bank lobby group IIF said in a statement they would take part in the exchange. That includes BNP Paribas , Deutsche Bank, National Bank of Greece , Allianz and Greylock Capital Management
"Neither the Steering Committee nor any of its members makes any recommendation or offers any advice to any other holder of PSI eligible debt," the statement said. "Each such holder must make their own decision whether or not to participate in those offers based on their own particular interests and on the advice and assistance of their own advisers."
"Neither the Steering Committee nor any of its members makes any recommendation or offers any advice to any other holder of PSI eligible debt," the statement said. "Each such holder must make their own decision whether or not to participate in those offers based on their own particular interests and on the advice and assistance of their own advisers."
Väga huvitav. Täna õhtuks peavad osalejad teatama oma osalemisest.
Bondholders have until Wednesday night to declare whether they will take part in the restructuring. Greece’s Public Debt Management Agency (PDMA) issued a statement Tuesday making it clear that Athens has no intention of honoring any bonds that are not volunteered for a haircut. “Greece’s economic program does not contemplate the availability of funds to make payments to private sector creditors that decline to participate in PSI,” it said. Sources told Kathimerini that holdouts will either be offered a much more onerous deal than those who take part in the restructuring or they will not be offered new bonds as sweeteners.
Societe Generale SA (GLE), France’s second-biggest bank, Assicurazioni Generali SpA and UniCredit SpA (UCG) joined firms saying they would participate in Greece’s debt swap.
Martin Wolfilt täna hea artikkel, kus ta hindab Euroopa fiskaallepingut ohtlikuks nii majanduslikul, poliitilisel kui juriidilisel tasandil. Seaduse üheks nurgakiviks on karmim fiskaalne distsipliin, nähes ette tasakaalus või ülejäägis eelarveid (struktuurne defitsiit ei tohiks ületada 0,5% nominaalsest SKTst). Lisaks sellele tuleb riikidel, kelle võlg on üle 60% SKTst iga aasta seda üle 60%i ületavat osa vähendada 1/20ndiku võrra (Itaalia 120% puhul teeks see 3% SKTst aastas), mis vajaks siis korralikku majanduskasvu või teisalt pidevat jõupingutust eelarve kulude ja tulude poolel, et võimalikult kõrget ülejääki saavutada. Aga nagu Martin Wolf kirjutab, siis struktuurseid defitsiite on väga keeruline hinnata.
Consider the structural fiscal positions for 2007, the last largely pre-crisis year, estimated by the International Monetary Fund in October 2007 – in “real time”, as it were. This was a year when the indicator needed to scream “crisis”. Yet it showed Spain with a large structural surplus and Ireland in structural balance (see chart). Both were even in better shape than Germany. Greece did have a sizeable structural deficit. But the French deficit was worse than that of Portugal. The rule would not have discriminated between vulnerable countries and immune ones because it ignores asset bubbles and financial manias.
The IMF then had second thoughts. By October 2011, it had concluded that Greece’s structural fiscal deficit in 2007 had been 10.4 per cent of GDP, not 4 per cent, and Ireland’s 8.4 per cent, not 0.1 per cent. This is not a criticism of the IMF. It merely shows that the concept the eurozone wishes to embed in a new treaty will fail when accuracy is most needed. The true structural deficit is unknowable.
Consider the political and legal implications. Would elected governments accept the guesstimates of unaccountable technocrats? How, moreover, are judges to reach a decision? Are they to evaluate the merits of alternative econometric models? Since huge changes in estimates of structural deficits are likely, how is a government to adapt? Putting an unmeasurable concept into the law seems mad.
Consider the structural fiscal positions for 2007, the last largely pre-crisis year, estimated by the International Monetary Fund in October 2007 – in “real time”, as it were. This was a year when the indicator needed to scream “crisis”. Yet it showed Spain with a large structural surplus and Ireland in structural balance (see chart). Both were even in better shape than Germany. Greece did have a sizeable structural deficit. But the French deficit was worse than that of Portugal. The rule would not have discriminated between vulnerable countries and immune ones because it ignores asset bubbles and financial manias.
The IMF then had second thoughts. By October 2011, it had concluded that Greece’s structural fiscal deficit in 2007 had been 10.4 per cent of GDP, not 4 per cent, and Ireland’s 8.4 per cent, not 0.1 per cent. This is not a criticism of the IMF. It merely shows that the concept the eurozone wishes to embed in a new treaty will fail when accuracy is most needed. The true structural deficit is unknowable.
Consider the political and legal implications. Would elected governments accept the guesstimates of unaccountable technocrats? How, moreover, are judges to reach a decision? Are they to evaluate the merits of alternative econometric models? Since huge changes in estimates of structural deficits are likely, how is a government to adapt? Putting an unmeasurable concept into the law seems mad.
Lühidalt ja kokkuvõtvalt - ei ole ühtegi märki, et Kreeka PSI ei õnnestuks ühel või teisel moel. Siiski ajaloo suurim võlakirjade restruktureerimine. Kõik tahavad show's osaleda, piletid ju ostetud.
Aga mis mehhanism võimaldaks mitteosalejatele teha HALVEMA pakkumise? CAC võimaldab vist laiendada enamuse aktsepteeritud pakkumist kõikidele?
Kas olukord pole sama kui Telekomi aktsiate sundvõõrandamisega? Kes vabatahtlikult müüsid, sellega on asjad selged (vabatahtlik kokkulepe), kes ei müünud said raha samapalju ja võimaluse sundvõõrandamise tõttu koos kristjaniga kohut käia ja lisahüvitisi nõuda.
Pealegi on kõigil kõrvalehoidjatel ilmselt olemas ka CDS pakid ja mida halvem pakkumin, seda rohkem raha peavad kindlustajad välja käima?
Kas olukord pole sama kui Telekomi aktsiate sundvõõrandamisega? Kes vabatahtlikult müüsid, sellega on asjad selged (vabatahtlik kokkulepe), kes ei müünud said raha samapalju ja võimaluse sundvõõrandamise tõttu koos kristjaniga kohut käia ja lisahüvitisi nõuda.
Pealegi on kõigil kõrvalehoidjatel ilmselt olemas ka CDS pakid ja mida halvem pakkumin, seda rohkem raha peavad kindlustajad välja käima?
Hispaania majanduslik olukord näitamas paraku jätkuvalt halvenemise märke: tööstustoodang langes jaanuaris aastasel baasil 4,2%, olles eelmisel kuul langenud 3,5% (korrigeeriti veidi ülespoole 3,7% pealt). Hispaania 10-aastase võlakirja tulusus täna ka kergelt tõusnud ja kaupleb hetkel 5,183% peal. Itaalia oma tõusis eile tagasi kõrgemale 5% piirist ja asub hetkel 5,063% peal.
Huvitav, enne oli deadline 8PM (GMT) neljapäeval....
Hetkel vist arvatakse, et osalus % jääb 66-90% vahele, st. CAC läheb käiku ja (osad?) reitinguagentuurid võivad, nagu nad on ka ähvardanud, hinnata olukorra default'iks, tagasiulatuva CACi pärast.
According to the Greek media, five small Greek pension funds, which include self-employed staff, journalists - Oh, dear - and police, hold around €2bn of Greek state bonds, around one percent of the total value of obligations earmarked for the debt swap, have declared their opposition to a huge debt writedown, which was designed to prevent a sovereign default.
Hetkel vist arvatakse, et osalus % jääb 66-90% vahele, st. CAC läheb käiku ja (osad?) reitinguagentuurid võivad, nagu nad on ka ähvardanud, hinnata olukorra default'iks, tagasiulatuva CACi pärast.
According to the Greek media, five small Greek pension funds, which include self-employed staff, journalists - Oh, dear - and police, hold around €2bn of Greek state bonds, around one percent of the total value of obligations earmarked for the debt swap, have declared their opposition to a huge debt writedown, which was designed to prevent a sovereign default.
113366, mitte osalejatele ei pakuta vahetusvõlakirju ja nad saavad kohe vitsad kätte. Fakt on, et osapooled suhtlevad otse ja Kreeka poolt juhib asja konkreetne keha. See tänane vs. homne tähtaeg on veits kummaline. Pigem siis võlausaldajate vastus tänaseks ja PSI täpse tehingu otsus homseks?
RBSi European economics team leiab, et PSI-st saadakse vähem raha kui plaanitud: "Even post-exercising of the CACs we believe that the Greek authorities will fail to achieve the €107bn of savings targeted. Indeed, while there are currently about €268bn of outstanding Greek bonds, the amount eligible is only of €206bn of which a large proportion of the international bonds and some other bonds (such as railway bonds), which might not end up being exchanged.
The best we think can be achieved is around 95% of the domestic bonds which would bring about savings of €87bn. A small participation of the other bonds and the participation of the ECB in sharing its profits out of the €56.5bn it is estimated holding might bring the level of savings closer to €95bn."
RBS estimate of the debt swap participation rate: "It is relatively easy to imagine that the participation rate amongst ‘regulated’ institutions will be close to 100% given that they have for most of them already written off the bulk of their exposures and because of the negative stigma that would be attached to a financial institution singled out as non cooperative. Banks are believed to own around €90bn of bonds (at face value and including Greek banks). Insurances companies are believed to own around €15bn and are also very likely to be participating in the deal which would lift the participation rate to 51%. Add the Greek social security funds and the participation rate reaches 63%. Based on IIF communication and press reports we arrive to a slightly lower level of 58% (see table below). The bottom line is that we believe that the participation rate will be at the very minimum around 60% (between 58% and 63%) and most likely close to 70%.
The best we think can be achieved is around 95% of the domestic bonds which would bring about savings of €87bn. A small participation of the other bonds and the participation of the ECB in sharing its profits out of the €56.5bn it is estimated holding might bring the level of savings closer to €95bn."
RBS estimate of the debt swap participation rate: "It is relatively easy to imagine that the participation rate amongst ‘regulated’ institutions will be close to 100% given that they have for most of them already written off the bulk of their exposures and because of the negative stigma that would be attached to a financial institution singled out as non cooperative. Banks are believed to own around €90bn of bonds (at face value and including Greek banks). Insurances companies are believed to own around €15bn and are also very likely to be participating in the deal which would lift the participation rate to 51%. Add the Greek social security funds and the participation rate reaches 63%. Based on IIF communication and press reports we arrive to a slightly lower level of 58% (see table below). The bottom line is that we believe that the participation rate will be at the very minimum around 60% (between 58% and 63%) and most likely close to 70%.
opex
Kui seega peaks juhtuma, et lõpuks < 60% võtab haircuti ei saa kreeklased CACi üldse käiku lasta ja peaksid lunastama 100%, milleks neil raha pole = default. Seda varianti kõik kardavadki.
Kõige selle juures läheksid vähemalt CDSid käiku ja see aitaks taastada veidi usaldust antud sektori suhtes. Ma mõned kuud tagasi viitasin börsipäevas Finance Addict artiklile, kus toodi välja, et otsuseid selle üle, kas CDS makstakse defaultimise vastu kindlustatule välja või mitte, teeb ISDA komitee, kuhu kuuluvad kõik suuremad pangad:
Ma hetkel ei leia kusagilt infot, kes on CDS-e peamiselt väljastanud, aga kahtlustan, et sellest loetelust võib mõne nime leida küll. Vähemalt selles The Market Oracle artiklis on toodud Argentiina defaultiga seotud CDSi probleemid (kus JPM oli osaline):
The credit default swap market has a history of conflicts, and the worst of them occur when it is time to settle up. For example, hedge funds Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. and HBK Master Fund LP thought they purchased protection against an Argentina default and sued when J.P. Morgan refused to pay off on Argentina credit protection contracts Eternity had purchased.
J.P. Morgan's posture was different when it wanted to collect on the protection it bought from Daehon, a South Korean Bank. J.P. Morgan claimed the slightly different contract language met the definition of restructuring under the credit default protection contract it had with the South Korean Bank.
The problem today is that some owners of credit default protection on Greece think they should be able to declare a credit event, but the ISDA cartel has issued an opinion that according to its interpretation of the documents, there has been no default. The problem has always been that contract language is subject to both abuse and "interpretation:"
Bloombergi vahendusel selgub, et Prantsusmaa suuruselt teine pank Societe Generale SA koos Itaalia UniCredit SpAga on teada andnud, et nemad osalevad võlakirja vahetusprogrammis.
Lisaks mõned numbrid: Kreeka defaulti puhul on CDSi väljastajatel vaja maksta maksimaalselt 3,25 miljardit USD eest kindlustusrahasid ja kogu eurotsooni riikide CDSi turg ulatub 109 miljardi dollarini.
Lisaks mõned numbrid: Kreeka defaulti puhul on CDSi väljastajatel vaja maksta maksimaalselt 3,25 miljardit USD eest kindlustusrahasid ja kogu eurotsooni riikide CDSi turg ulatub 109 miljardi dollarini.
Saksamaa jaanuarikuu tehastetellimused aastasel baasil -4,9% vs oodatud -1,7%. Eelmise kuuga võrreldes -2,7% vs oodatud +0,6%.